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March 04 2012
Russia: Ballot Stuffing or Machine Testing?
Glenn Kates (@gkates) shares a link to an election webcam video from a polling station in the North Ossetian village of Chikola, which “appears to show ballot stuffing.” “They could just be testing the machine though,” @gkates adds. Of the 91 comments on the video's YouTube page, the most popular right now is the one posted four hours ago by user rus1488rus [ru] and “liked” by 45 viewers: “To test [the machine], it's enough to feed it just one ballot )))”
March 03 2012
Russia: Photos from Elections in Yakutsk
On the Yakutsk City Facebook page, local blogger Bolot Bochkarev (eYakutia is one of his projects) has started posting photos [ru] from the presidential and mayoral elections in the capital of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic, which is six hours ahead of Moscow.
Russia: A Last-Minute Overview of Pre-Election Blogging
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
On Dec. 31, 1999, as Russians were celebrating New Year's Eve, a holiday that transcends religion and politics, President Boris Yeltsin went on the air and announced that Vladimir Putin would be instated as acting President. Before signing off, he added: “I want to beg forgiveness for your dreams that never came true. And also I would like to beg forgiveness not to have justified your hopes.”
In the aftermath of the devastating apartment bombings that occurred in September 1999 and the launching of the Second Chechen War, Mr. Putin's sole platform for the 2000 Russian presidential election was counter-terrorism in the North Caucasus. Beyond that, Mr. Putin refused to campaign or to join a political party. Nevertheless, he finished first among the 11 candidates with 53% of the vote - and the “Putin Era” began.
Twelve years later, Mr Putin's candidacy seems much more turbulent, as protesters took to the the streets alleging improprieties in the Dec. 2011 parliamentary elections. Still, polling data suggests that he is heading into Sunday's election with the support of the majority of the electorate.
Protesters hold a poster against the Russian Prime Minister and presidential candidate Vladimir Putin during a rally for fair elections in St. Petersburg, Russia. Photo by MIKE KIREEV, copyright © Demotix (25/02/12).
For World Affairs Journal Blog, Vladimir Kara-Murza contextualized the March 4 election in a post entitled, “In Sunday's Vote, It's Putin Vs. Russia”:
On Monday, Polish composer Krzysztof Penderecki was at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow, attending a performance of Rodion Shchedrin’s opera Dead Souls. As the performance was getting underway, spectators noticed Penderecki in the box and started booing. The legendary musician was bewildered, not understanding the reason for such hostility. Only later was it explained to him that the audience mistook him for Vladimir Churov, the chairman of Russia’s Central Electoral Commission — to whom he indeed bears an uncanny resemblance.
As Sunday’s presidential election draws near, the public frustration with Vladimir Putin is becoming increasingly apparent. Over the weekend, thousands of Muscovites formed a human chain alongside the 10-mile Garden Ring Road — inspired by the pro-independence “Baltic Way” of 1989 — to protest Putin’s return to power and demand free and fair elections. In St. Petersburg, thousands of people from across the political spectrum marched through the city center calling for “a peaceful revolution.” Attitudes to the regime are also being expressed in less political ways: a mock Channel One “news report” from the future showing Putin’s arrest and trial in Moscow became an instant online hit, with five million views in one week. […]
Sean Guillory of Sean's Russia Blog provided the background for the candidates running against Mr. Putin:
[…] Indeed, the Russian presidential election has been anything but ordinary. Sure, the official cast of characters remains virtually identical to past contests, save a few additions. Communist Party stalwart, Gennady Ziuganov still plays the role of “loyal opposition in-chief,” the aging face of a Communist Party that has the organizational resources to actually present a political alternative to Putin, but lacks the so-called “Leninist will” to adapt to present political conditions. Part of that adaption, however, would require dumping Ziuganov and forsake its aging electorate, something the KPRF mandarins and rank and file are still unwilling to do. Opposite Ziuganov is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, another perennial “loyal oppositionist.” Zhirik plays the harlequin in this grand performance, adding outrageous, comic relief to a show already thin on drama. In a way, Zhirinovsky reflects the whole process itself, a clown for a clownish spectacle. Then there is Mikhail Prokhorov, the new addition to the cast. Prokhorov serves as a kind of Khodorkovsky-lite (since the real Khodorkovsky is less pliable and, well, in jail for the foreseeable future). An oligarch who “made” the bulk of his wealth in the “loans for shares” scheme that saved Boris Yeltsin from defeat in the 1996 Presidential election, Prokhorov, unlike Khodorkovsky, not only understood the rules of the game, but also played them correctly. But the biggest question that has dogged Prokhorov is not his past, but whether he’s a Kremlin project or not. I suspect that he’s a mixture. One thing is clear to me after reading Julia Ioffe’s profile of him in the New Yorker is that Prokhorov’s biggest obstacle is that he’s a sleazeball. Bringing up the rear is Just Russia’s candidate, Sergei Mironov. His candidacy only inspires one question: Who’s he? […]
Along with the results of the election itself, freedom of expression has been a resounding issue for the past few months.
Committee to Protect Journalists Blog provided details to the backlash the Russian media endured after its coverage of the protests surrounding the controversial Dec. 2011 parliamentary elections:
[…] On December 12, Russian tycoon Alisher Usmanov, owner of the Kommersant Publishing House - which produces independent business daily Kommersant and several other news outlets - announced that he was sacking Maksim Kovalsky, chief editor of the popular weekly magazine Kommersant-Vlast. Demyan Kudryavtsev, the publisher's executive director, announced he would resign. The news was a huge blow, as Kovalsky and Kudryavtsev are leading journalists and considered fathers of Kommersant and its publisher.
The magazine's coverage of the parliamentary election was surely the reason for Kommersant's beheading. A week after the vote, most of Kommersant-Vlast's coverage was of the alleged fraud that led to public outrage and protests unprecedented in Russia in the past decade. But Usmanov - believed to be in Putin's close circle - zeroed in on a formal reason to punish the magazine. In its December 12 issue, Kommersant-Vlast published a picture of a ballot cast in London for the opposition Yabloko party; the ballot carried a hand-written insult to Putin across it. Usmanov publicly scolded the magazine for “unacceptable use of coarse language,” and said it was unethical and “on the borderline of hooliganism.” The magazine removed the picture from its website, but it was circulated on social networks, including Kommersant reporter Oleg Kashin's Twitter account.
The removal of Kovalsky and Kudryavtsev angered their colleagues at Kommersant. Two days later, dozens of journalists from Usmanov's news outlets - including independent news website Gazeta - signed and published online an open letter headlined, “We are forced into cowardice.” Veronika Kucyllo, a long-serving deputy editor at Kommersant-Vlast, announced her resignation in protest of Usmanov's decision.
Another important theme this election season has been the role of citizen media as a catalyst of political activism in Russia. Even though they are harder to censor than mainstream news sources, they are not totally immune to censorship, however, as Global Voices discussed in a post entitled, “Why are Russians Protesting Now?”
In a post entitled, “The Man Vladimir Putin Fears Most,” Wall Street Journal Blog predicts that blogger and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny will have an impact on the presidential election:
[…] Anticorruption blogger and activist Alexei Navalny will be in the middle of it — as he has been over the past three months of Russia's unexpected political awakening. By the tens of thousands, Russians shed their fear and apathy to protest December's fraud-ridden parliamentary elections and Mr. Putin's hold on power. From a crowded stage of opposition figures, Mr. Navalny has emerged as the charismatic and fresh face of the movement.
The next phase will test him and the opposition. The series of large demonstrations after December exposed the shallowness of support for Mr. Putin in the large cities and public frustration with the political stagnation and lack of accountability in Russia. Yet the rallies forced no notable government concessions. Though weakened, Mr. Putin gets a new term and possibly energy to reverse his slide or to crack down. […]
Tolik Belenko's Russian-language LiveJounal blog included a link to a “Nashi” announcement [ru] that the pro-Putin youth group has made plans to quash civil unrest in the aftermath of the elections:
On March 5, a few thousand activists from the groups “Nashi” and “Steel” will take to the streets of Moscow in order to prevent any illegal activity aimed at destabilizing society in the aftermath of the Russian presidential election.
LJ user tolik_belenko also shared the link to Nashi's announcement on his ya.ru page [ru]. Readers' comments were somewhat ominous.
Johnny TraHvoltin wrote [ru]:
This has already happened, though not with us, but in China, when [Mao Zedong] occasionally called out the [Red Guards Hóng Wèibīng] troops to the streets in order to maintain order. How did it end? Read history.
Svetlana wrote [ru]:
It's not yet tomorrow. Why guess? We shall see.
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
Russia: Pre-Election Summaries
At OpenDemocracy.net, LJ user drugoi (Rustem Adagamov) “outlines how his trust in the outgoing president vanished and sums up the mood in Russia’s capital just days ahead of the country’s presidential election.” Sean Guillory of Sean's Russia Blog examines the “known knowns and unknown unknowns” of the upcoming vote and its aftermath.
March 01 2012
Russia: The Early Days of Government Transparency
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
“Make your work available online.”
It may seem a harmless demand, but in Russia it's more than that.
Such a request led to Alexey Navalny, a famed anti-establishment blogger and activist, scrutinizing public procurement contracts to expose shady practices by officials and private companies.
Navalny's project, RosPil [ru], helped earn him the reputation of Russia's most viable opposition leader — though he says he won't partake in or respect elections that aren't clean (a popular stance these days).
The RosPil project exposes corruption in Russia. Photo: Sven Hultberg Carlsson
That Navalny and other contributors to RosPil were able to examine public procurements — a job that needs doing not only in Russia — is thanks to a small triumph of open governance. At the end of 2005, enough pressure had been laid on the Kremlin for its leaders to make public procurement contracts available to the public.
The simple but insistent demand had come from the Freedom of Information Foundation (FIF) [ru], a non-profit founded in 2004. In a recent interview with Global Voices, Ivan Pavlov, its chairman, argues that open access to government information enbles citizens to act as a check on their rulers:
Everyone agrees that corruption is a huge problem in Russia. But the government's solution has been stronger government control. I believe that public control is much more effective. Government information must therefore be available so that the public can exercise control over it and oversee its actions.
Our demand is that the government and all public institutions make everything that isn't secret available to the public on a website.
The Foundation has made encouraging advances in their field. Early in Dmitry Medvedev's presidency, when his reform initiatives had a semblance of bite to them, work on Russia's Freedom of Information Act began to gain momentum.
With the help of persistent officials at Russia's Ministry of Economic Development — officials who, coincidentally or not, “no longer work there” — the Duma passed what Pavlov deems a “revolutionary” and “very progressive” piece of legislation:
The Freedom of Information Act was Medvedev's greatest achievement as president. I am an optimist and still believe the act will change the whole Russian system. But the government has to use this immense resource as a way to change. So far, that hasn't happened.
The act has been in effect since 2010. Its implementation is lacking. Little if any information is provided when requests are put to authorities, prompting the Foundation to litigate against secretive bodies that, believe it or not, are breaking the law.
Veracity tests have become a daily routine. When Medvedev proclaimed the need for an independent judiciary, Pavlov’s organisation put Russian courts to the test.
Many courts were unwilling to publish short bios and pictures of their judges online, but some reacted positively to the challenge. Pavlov says:
The courts may have published this information because they wanted to take the lead in our ratings. But I hope that these courts also understand how such a decision can contribute to society.
Of course, making information available online does not guarantee transparent governance. Pavlov admits that sensitive information is the hardest to expose.
Very few government agencies, federal or regional, want their financial records in public view. Information on cash flow, which could expose corruption, is kept secret — not only by the authorities, but by non-profit organisations as well.
And in the week of Russia’s presidential elections, there is an elephant in the room. Vladimir Putin, very likely about to enter his third term as president, favours a closed society. Russia’s ministries, reluctant collaborators even during Medvedev’s presidency, are much less prone to cooperation now.
The Freedom of Information Foundation operate from their offices in St. Petersburg. Photo: Sven Hultberg Carlsson
Even historical records, politically less toxic for today's leaders, are off limits. Historians researching the Soviet-era repressions cannot examine victims’ records without explicit approval by each related family.
Why, then, would information incriminating the Kremlin directly be brought to light?
Pavlov explains:
Putin cannot control the whole system. My hope is that the popular demands we have seen increase since the Duma elections last year will bring about change.
We see Russia developing in our research. In 2005 two thirds of Russia's federal executive agencies had no websites. Today all of them do.
But projects like RosPil cannot be alone. Civil activists and NGOs must use the Freedom of Information Act to expose situations where there is no justice.
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
Russia: Vladivostok's Pre-Election Puzzle
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
On the eve of the March 4 presidential election in Russia, the level of political voltage has reached its tipping point. The Russian authorities are neither able to ignore the large-scale protests across the country, nor able to adequately respond to the people’s demands.
Everyone and everything has turned political now, and the Far Eastern city of Vladivostok has caught this pre-election fever as well.
The most recent example is the mysterious ad campaign that many of Vladivostok's netizens are discussing right now. It may turn out to be a purely commercial, non-political project - but it definitely plays on public interest and ignites the debate by using up-to-date political images.
First, large banners asking “Who? Who?” appeared on one of the city's streets (the image below comes from this article [ru] on PrimaMedia.ru and is reproduced here in accordance with the portal's re-publication rules [ru]):
‘Who? Who?' Photo by Anton Balashov/primamedia.ru
This question may well refer to the presidential candidates running in the March 4 election - or it may not. The approach here is common for both commercial and political campaigns: the initial ads do not point at any specific product/candidate explicitly. (Examples of similar political ads that have appeared in Vladivostok recently are here and here: the first one states that the country was first destroyed in 1917, during the Russian revolution, and then some more in 1991, at end of the Soviet era, while what happens in 2012 remains to be seen; the second one is asking, “Chaos, again?”.)
It did not take long for the answers to appear - but, just like the initial “Who? Who?” question, they left Vladivostok's residents puzzled and confused: big banners appeared all over the city, featuring, among others, Sponge Bob [ru], Avatar's Toruk Makto [ru], Michael Jackson and Mr. Bean [ru], and the Coat-Clad Horse from a popular Russian slang rhyme.
Somewhat later, bloggers caught these ads with the same characters on PrimPogoda.ru, a local weather portal:
Screenshots of the ‘Who? Who?' answers that appeared in the ad section of PrimPogoda.ru: Sponge Bob, a Coat-Clad Horse, Toruk Makto
LJ user alexhitrov's solution to this puzzle [ru] is the one that the local online community seems to favor the most. He pointed out that the PrimPogoda.ru ads had a checked box with a number next to each of the characters mentioned above - and he also supplied a screenshot of a TV news program that showed a sample voting ballot for the upcoming election:
Each presidential candidate [on the sample voting ballot] is represented by one of the characters [in the mysterious ads] and, of course, there's a corresponding number on the ballot.
According to alexhitrov, Toruk Makto represents Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party; Sponge Bob is Sergey Mironov, the leader of the Just Russia party; and Vladimir Putin, #5, has to be the proverbial Horse in the Coat.
LJ user vladimir_golev wrote this [ru], referring to the cartoon character rather than the political candidate that Sponge Bob seems to represent in this context:
I'd vote for Sponge Bob. Sponge Bob is about stability, above all.
Russia will learn the name of its next head of state relatively soon. Vladivostok residents will probably also get to discover the meaning of the mysterious ad campaign, its punchline.
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
February 29 2012
Russia: Great Lent Has Begun
Citizen media outlets captured the multidimensional essence of the Russian Orthodox Lenten season, which began Monday, including issues such the religiosity of post-USSR Russia, the liturgical calendar, the peculiarities of the Orthodox traditions and fasting rituals compared to those observed in the West, and the public statements made by prominent church officials.
Holy Transfiguration Monastery Publications blog contextualized the Lenten Triodion among the other four liturgical books recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church:
Four books contain the festal services necessary for the liturgical year.
The Menaion contains the feasts of the Lord, the Mother of God, and the Saints, for every day of the year.
The Triodion contains the services for Great Lent, the three weeks before, and Holy Week.
The Pentecostarion contains the feasts of Pascha through Pentecost and All Saints.
The Octoëchos provides eight one-week cycles of services in one of each of the eight tones.
Pancake week/Maslenitsa celebration in St. Petersburg. Photo by YURY GOLDENSHTEYN, copyright © Demotix (26/02/12).
Russia is celebrating Shrovetide, or Pancake week, one of the jolliest, most vivid and fun-filled feasts here.
The tradition of celebrating Shrovetide came to us from pre-Christian Russia. This is a feast of bidding farewell to winter, injected with the joyful anticipation of spring’s arrival, Nature’s awakening and the renewal of life. Shrovetide was the name of a straw effigy, dresses in women’s garments, which was first used in the general merriment, and at the end of the feast – burnt in a bonfire.
An invariable attribute of Shrovetide were pancakes, round in shape – symbolizing the sun, and as such – a ritual dish.
Sophia's bilingual LiveJournal blog discussed last week how the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity observe different traditions in celebrating the beginning of Lent:
Ash Wednesday, in the [Gregorian] calendar of Western Christianity, is the first day of Lent and occurs 46 days before Easter. It is a moveable fast, falling on a different date each year because it is dependent on the date of Easter. It can occur as early as February 4 or as late as March 10.
In Russia we have Clean Monday instead of Ash wednesday, it is also known as Pure Monday, Ash Monday, or Green Monday, is the first day of the Eastern Orthodox Christian and Eastern Catholic Great Lent.
St. Nicholas Russian Orthodox Church blog provides recipes for Lenten Main Dishes, while Orthodox Education Blog includes a link to printable Lenten coloring books for children.
“Why We Were Created” Blog by Catholic Eric Sammons introduced some of the differences between how the Lenten season is celebrated by the Eastern and Western traditions:
The Eastern Lent is similar in intention to the Western Lent, except it is much more severe in practice. [Russian Orthodox Christians] are asked to give up all meat, dairy products and alcohol throughout the entire season (think of that when you are complaining about not eating meat this Friday). They also calculate the days differently than in the West – [Western Christianity does] not count Sundays, whereas [Orthodox Christians] do and they end the counting before Psalm Sunday and consider Holy Week a whole different penitential “season.”
Ancient Faith Radio Blog posted a 15-minute audio recording of Fr. Andrew Damick's discussion on the differences between the Eastern and Western Lenten traditions. In it he emphasized that Orthodox Christians observe lent more as a community and with the assistance of a confessor with the ultimate goal being to become more receptive to God's grace. For Orthodox Christians, he added, Great Lent represents a lifestyle that is merely intensified during this season.
Aleks' bilingual blog summarized the author's understanding of why fasting is a necessary component of the Christian faith:
I do not know the official teachings of the Orthodox Church regarding fasting, but I'm sure that my views expressed here are not far from the truth. There are a lot of reasons for fasting, but the most obvious to me are (in order of importance):
1. Christians by definition must imitate Christ. Jesus, before starting His Ministry of the Good News, fasted for 40 days. […]
2. Food, and, most importantly delicious, food by itself is a very good thing (trust me, I know). The problem is that its ubiquity has the potential to become the most easily accessible temptation. […] Although I have to mention that not eating is not the essence, the reason, or the purpose of fasting. Physical fast will be useless if we, for example, continue to ignore neighbor's needs, if we continue to swear and be angry, etc. […]
3. Easter is the most important holiday for Christians. Without it there would be no Church, nor the saving Gospel. Therefore, Christians try to prepare for this very special celebration in very special manner. […]
Global Voices introduced Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin as well as Patriarch Kirill in a January 2012 post entitled, “The Russian Orthodox Church Re-Enters Politics.” Similarly, both men have made public their views on how the Great Lent should be observed by Russians.
While Patriarch Kirill urged Russians to meditate on their own futures as well as the future of Russia, Archpriest Chaplin, according to the Moscow News, said that “people observing lent should refrain from watching talk shows or using online social networks.”
Fr. Oliver Herbel mirrored such thoughts on the importance of moderation in internet usage during Great Lent in a March 2011 post for Pravmir.com blog:
Some in Orthodoxy pride themselves on being “luddites,” that is, as those who are generally against technological progress. This parallels those non-Orthodox Christians in America who see “www” as standing for “666.” On the other hand, some in Orthodoxy, including clergy, are quick to grab the first gadget to hit the market. With regard to the use of the internet, similar patterns may be seen amongst the Orthodox. Some Orthodox will avoid nearly all Orthodox-specific sites or at least any site that dares to address contemporary issues, believing that what matters is only “spiritual” things that can affect one’s soul and that there is nothing one can do to help with current difficulties within the Church. Others will engage any Orthodox site and/or blog and comment frequently, believing that such engagement is contributing to Orthodoxy or sometimes that such engagement is a healthy way to “vent” frustrations. Both approaches to the internet are wrong, even during Great Lent. What is needed is balance.
Russia: An Overview of the Pre-Election Anglophone Blogging
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
The pre-election month of February has been filled with reports of large-scale gatherings of both the opponents and the supporters of Russia's current regime. On Monday, Feb. 27, however, as the countdown to the March 4 presidential vote entered its final stages, the news of the foiled attempt to assassinate Vladimir Putin, the Russian PM and one of the presidential candidates, temporarily succeeded in shifting the spotlight onto the person who may re-enter Russia's political scene as the head of state quite soon - and away from the citizens, their hopes, fears and demands.
Below is a quick overview of what some of the Anglophone bloggers have been writing about the pre-election politics in Russia this past month.
Mark Galeotti of In Moscow's Shadows shared initial thoughts on the Putin assassination plot:
[…] I’m willing to accept that this was a real plot, not some complete fabrication (as some seem to imply). On the other hand, the news was obviously held back with the aim of seizing the news cycle just before the elections. This is not exactly unique to Russians, but considering the wide scale skepticism, even downright disbelief with which the revelation has been greeted in Russia, this does not seem to have been an especially effective tactic. To be honest, how many times can you play the same kind of card? […]
Mark Adomanis wrote this on the same issue:
[…] Discussion has already turned to the political significance of this plot, and it is fully possible that it augurs for a “tightening of the screws” and that Putin will once again use the threat of terrorism as an excuse to tighten political control (recall that the most dramatic re-centralization of political power occurred in the aftermath of the attack on Beslan). However I lean towards a slightly less malign interpretation in which the thwarting of this plot is merely a PR stunt and an opportunity for some (mostly harmless) pre-election chest thumping: Putin will get a chance to play the aggrieved victim of aggression, a role he plays very well, and say a few things about the tenacity and determination of his government in confronting and defeating terror. We’ll see what happens, but given the totality of the political situation in Russia and the obvious weakening of Putin’s position I don’t think a dramatic re-centralization of power is even possible, at least without the widespread use of force. […]
St. Petersburg: "For Putin" banners inside a bus that has brought people to a presidential campaign rally in support of the Russian PM. Photo by YURY GOLDENSHTEYN, copyright © Demotix (18/02/12).
Eugene Ivanov of The Ivanov Report has produced a series of posts on the upcoming election: The Dinosaur (on Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Feb. 9) Putin and the Polls (Feb. 16), Putin and Elites (Feb. 21), and Putin and Protesters (Feb. 26). In the latest post, he put the recent rallies into perspective and explained their significance for Putin's political future:
I’m puzzled when someone begins comparing the number of people participating in pro- and anti-Putin demonstrations in Russia: to me, it’s like comparing the number of apples with the size of oranges. I get even more puzzled when I hear that by putting more people on the streets, the Kremlin “has won” over its opponents. It’s about the same as to say that because the admirers of Yo-Yo Ma can be comfortably accommodated in the Carnegie Hall with its 2,800 seats whereas Britney Spears can easily attract a crowd of 30,000 fans at a sports arena, the pop diva is ten-time better musician than the venerable cellist.
[…]
What the protesters should really pay attention to is their message. Brought together by the power of a single emotion – the outrage at the rigged Duma elections – they now need to transform their “raw feelings” into a set of comprehensive political goals and demands. Far from trying to beat the Kremlin in the game of numbers, the protesters should actually reduce the size of their columns by decisively parting with the nationalists, monarchists and the like. And if they want to broaden their appeal, they would better outreach to industrial workers whose loyalty to Putin is only conditional and may rapidly disappear should Russia’s economic situation deteriorate.
[…]
Yet, the major reason Putin so far hasn’t made any attempt to start a dialog with the protesters is that he doesn’t understand them. Putin seems to be genuinely at a loss to figure out why a bunch of well fed people would go on a protest action, especially if their grievances are caused by such a nuisance as “irregularities” in the parliamentary elections. The concept that some people may value their principles and their dignity over material well-being seems to be completely foreign to Putin. (Apparently, there are no such people in the close circle of Putin’s associates.) That’s why he tries to explain their behavior by something he can comprehend: money, directives from the State Department, or “orange leprosy.” […]
Following the Feb. 4 opposition rallies, Mark Adomanis compared the turnout in Moscow with that in other Russian cities:
[…] One thing that does seem noteworthy, though, is that the protests in other Russian cities seem to have been rather underwhelming. […]
[…]
What does this mean for the future of the protests? Well, probably nothing good. Putin and his team are not going to be easy to displace, and I think only a sustained and truly nation-wide popular mobilization could possibly compel them to do so. As always, the situation is fluid and should be watched closely, but there are certainly indications that Putin’s grip on power remains quite secure in large sections of the country. His image has taken a very big and very noteworthy dent, but at this juncture it seems improper to project the palpable anger and frustration of Muscovites onto all Russians. […]
Kevin Rothrock of A Good Treaty moved a few levels down from the overly familiar nationwide politics story, taking a closer look at the relatively obscure local confrontation that occurred in the town of Lermontov in Stavropol region; not surprisingly, he discovered that the latter shared its most important elements with the former:
Yesterday, the town of Lermontov (located in Russia’s North Caucasus) experienced what some are calling “a small revolution.” As the state municipal building was preparing to close for the evening, a collection of townsfolk and former members of the city council gathered and eventually forced their way into the main lobby. Once inside, reporters accompanying the activists took turns interviewing ex-deputies and disgruntled locals. Acting head of the city’s government Viktor Vasil’ev warned protesters that they were breaking the law by illegally occupying state property. Undeterred, the former deputies announced the beginning of an indefinite hunger strike, promising to occupy Lermontov’s municipal building night and day, until their demands are met: chiefly, the cancelation of the city’s upcoming local elections, which the ex-deputies consider to be illegitimate because they were denied the right to participate.
[…]
The Lermontov ‘crisis’ has something for everyone. If you’re a diehard enemy of the Putin regime, there are former city officials protesting in the open, linking local regional corruption to the Kremlin’s evil influence. Certainly, many aspects of the Lermontov election — barred candidates, political control of the courts, and the squashing of local independence — echo the larger criticisms commonly made of ‘Putinism.’
On the other hand, fans of the Prime Minister seem to find it inspiring that several of the assembled protesters are reaching out to Putin in the tradition of ‘good tsarism,’ hoping that he’ll notice their plight and swoop in to right the city’s wrongs. […]
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
February 25 2012
Russia: Bloggers' Photo Reports and Reflections on Pro-Putin Rally in Moscow
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
On Thursday, Feb. 23, ten days before the March 4 presidential election, the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin addressed thousands of people at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow. The Guardian's Miriam Elder described the event as “a gathering reminiscent of Soviet spectacle both in rhetoric and style”:
[…] Thousands of workers from the provinces were bussed in or rushed on to trains to attend the event. […]
A rally in support of PM Vladimir Putin took place in Moscow on Feb. 23, ahead of the presidential election on March 4. Photo by Irina Firsova, copyright © Demotix (23/02/12).
A number of Moscow-based bloggers attended the Feb. 23 rally, too. Below is a selection of their photo reports and observations, along with some of the remarks from their audiences.
LJ user mi3ch posted 17 photos and wrote [ru]:
Absolutely ordinary people. Trusting. Good. Like my aunt. Like my next-door neighbor. Students, workers, [state employees], pensioners. Seven out of ten - women. Mothers and grandmothers. And they really like Putin. He is so brave and decisive. […]
Their main distinction from [those who attended the opposition's rallies at Bolotnaya Square] are their faces. At Luzhniki, hardly anyone was smiling. And almost everyone walked silently. […]
LJ user otshellnica rebuked the blogger [ru] in the comments section:
At Bolotnaya, you could find the same [unsmiling] faces in the multi-thousand crowd. Just as there were nice and smiling faces at this rally. You, of all people, shouldn't be playing with such cheap arguments.
LJ user maxsytch offered [ru] a different point of comparison between the anti- and pro-Putin rallies:
The difference was in the percentage of the people who came to Bolotnaya and Luzhniki voluntarily.
Ryazan-based LJ user tamrat elaborated [ru] on the definition of ‘voluntarily,' citing her city's participation in the Feb. 23 rally as an example:
People from Ryazan enterprises came voluntarily - and joyfully. And whether they are for Putin or not is irrelevant. They had a tour of Moscow for free! They were taken there, got fed, listened to a concert. And all this for free! People came back home happy. And nothing will change in our country until a person can be made happy with free food and a trip!
LJ user vova-maltsev posted 14 photos [ru] and recounted his quick conversations with some of the rally's participants:
[…]
- Why are you here?
- We've been brought in here, [damn it].
- Are you for Putin?
- [Screw him], our salary's 17,000 [rubles a month, $580].[…]
There were [Tajik migrant workers] sitting in one of the buses.
- Are you for Putin?
- [We work as cleaners in Izmailovo, damn it, and we are stuck here now. Will have to do our job all night.][…]
Nice [female] school cooks.
- What are you doing here?
- We've been dispatched here.
- To cook porridge [for the rally's participants]?
- Yes.
- Did you go to Bolotnaya?
- No, they didn't send us there.
- Are you for Putin?
- Yes, of course… Are you a journalist?
- Yes. I'm not for Putin.
- (whispering) We are all against him. All our teachers are against, too.
An anonymous reader left this comment [ru] to LJ user vova-maltsev's post:
[They are being drawn there forcefully.] They aren't even getting paid, the motivation is their fear of problems at work + 1 day off. This info is 100% true. Relatives work at a state enterprise, in Moscow.
LJ user panzicov (Alexei Vitvitskiy) posted 48 photos [ru] on his blog. Five of these photos, the blogger claims, show a group of people allegedly being paid for their participation in the rally:
[…] The conscience of the people costs 800 rubles [$27] for two hours, [the money] was being handed out at [Park Kultury metro station] right after the rally. […]
Seven photos in LJ user panzicov's report show a group of young black men carrying handmade banners with pro-Putin slogans on them. Another blogger, LJ user drandin (Igor Drandin), talked with these men, asking them where they were from, and posted the video [ru, en] on his blog and on YouTube; one of the men explained, in English, that they were from Kenya.
LJ user pier_luigi, commenting on LJ user panzicov's post, wrote this [ru] about Putin's Kenyan supporters:
North Korea this is not - not yet… But the representatives of international Putinism are very impressive!
LJ user tushinetc posted 16 photos [ru] taken before most of the rally's participants took their seats at the Luzhniki Stadium. One of the photos shows empty seats with identical plastic bags on them. LJ user tushinetc explained:
[…] Some organizations took good care of their employees, making sure they do not get cold while sitting on plastic [seats]. In each bag placed on the seats there's a blanket, as well as a candy and a tangerine, and on the seat itself, there's [a cloth mat for sitting]. […]
LJ user 2014imeretinka commented [ru]:
How mean! For a candy and a tangerine…
LJ user panfilosoff replied [ru]:
Not mean at all… If you don't attend, you'll have serious problems at work, and if you do attend, you'll get a reward and a tangerine. Everything's simple and logical.
This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.
February 23 2012
Russia: Pro-Putin Rally in Vladivostok Causes Controversy
The Feb. 18 pro-Putin rally - a Puting - in Vladivostok. Photo by Alexander Hitrov/LJ user alexhitrov, used with permission.
Rallies in support of the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin - also known as Putings, a combination of the words “meeting” and “Putin” - took place in many Russian cities last weekend. One such Puting caused a scandal in the Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, which is renowned for its strong support of the opposition and for anti-Kremlin moods in general.
A local news portal VL.ru uploaded a video showing that the participants of the Feb. 18 rally received money after the event. VL.ru reporters asked if the participants were satisfied with Putin’s policies and reforms. Respondents used various clichés, saying that Putin “raised Russia from its knees” and provided stability for the country.
Vladivostok's online community actively discussed the nature of the events and the fact that people had been brought to the rally on buses in an organized way. Apparently, someone had motivated, mobilized and gathered them. The turnout of 2,000 to 4,000 people is a very rare case for Vladivostok, where even the most popular anti-government protests could hardly count 500 people.
Lists of participants and payments at the Feb. 18 pro-Putin rally in Vladivostok. Photo by Alexander Hitrov/LJ user alexhitrov, used with permission.
This case would have been forgotten fast if the discussion of it had not spread virally. The local authorities added fuel to the flames as well.
Regional trade unions had organized the rally, and they were the first to be blamed for handing out the money. Viktor Pinsky, head of the Primorsky Region's Federation of Trade Unions, said [ru] that the demonstration “brought together more than 4,000 people who are not indifferent to the fate of Russia, who trust Vladimir Putin and support his candidacy for the presidency.”
Trade unions said [ru] that all the media materials and videos available online were nothing but a provocation, and that the videos were fake and people were acting on them. That is why trade unions would like to initiate an investigation into the matter. PM Putin’s Chief of Staff in Vladivostok believes [ru] that the oppositional forces were outraged by the fact that 4,000 people showed up for the pro-Putin rally and were thus trying to sabotage the event.
Various bloggers, journalists and news organizations have provided images of the people who had lists of the participants and were handing out money (500 rubles = 16 USD). These images are widely available online: LJ user alexhitrov - a Vladivostok-based photographer Alexander Hitrov - posted a comprehensive photo report [ru] from the rally on his blog, and LJ user hajoff posted a few more images in the Vladivostok LJ community, here [ru].
Even if the trade unions claimed that people participated in this rally voluntarily, why would someone have lists of participants and cross the names out? LJ user temniykot wrote [ru]:
I've been to the rally. Haven't heard about or seen any “payments” - but it is true that people from regional enterprises were being brought in and marked as “was there/wasn't there,” and that people were being brought on buses from somewhere, and that the pensioners were being given jackets (and some were taking four [jackets per person]) […].
According to all reports, the event was well-organized: posters had been prepared and printed beforehand, people wore jackets with pro-Putin slogans on them, and organizers provided hot food, tea and a musical performance for the participants. It is obvious that Putin’s supporters had enough money for all this, but where does the funding come from? If it comes from the state budget, then this case should clearly be investigated. And this time, it should be investigated not in favor of the trade unions.
February 22 2012
Russia: Navalny vs Kadyrov
At Jamestown Foundation Blog, Valery Dzutsev reports that Ramzan Kadyrov, the President of Chechnya, has called politician and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny “a real chatterbox” - and Navalny retaliated by publishing (here and, later, here; ru) “the results of his investigation of the Chechen police’s car inventory acquisitions, naming and shaming several people in Kadyrov’s entourage […].”
February 15 2012
Russia, U.S.: An Overview of Alexander Ovechkin's NHL Career
Alexander Ovechkin is a Russian-born NHL hockey player who is surrounded by controversy due to his aggressive style of play, but who remains in the public spotlight because of his talent and pure sensationalism.
At the age of 26, Mr. Ovechkin is the only player ever named to the 1st NHL All-Star team in each of his first five seasons. He's also the only player ever to have received the Art Ross Trophy for leading the league in scoring points, the Maurice Richard Trophy, which is given to the league's leading goal scorer, the Lester B. Pearson Award, which is given to the NHL Players Association most outstanding player, and the Hart Memorial Trophy, which is the Professional Hockey Writers' pick as the league's most valuable player - as well as win all four in a single season.
Although he was the first overall selection in the 2004 NHL draft, due to the NHL lockout during the 2004-2005 season, it was not until October 2005 that Mr. Ovechkin scored two goals in his first game for the Capitals in their 3-2 victory over the Columbus Blue Jackets. Less than two years later, in January 2007, Yahoo Sports Blog announced that Mr. Ovechkin had been named team captain:
And enough with the talk of him not accepting it a few years ago because of his poor command of English. Ovechkin himself confirmed it Tuesday that he just wanted to get more NHL experience and earn the respect of his peers and teammates before accepting the honor. Becoming the sixth Russian captain in NHL history, Ovechkin will try to be the first to actually win the Cup. Until recently Don Cherry's myth that a team can't win a Stanley Cup with a European captain was alive and well. Not anymore […].
The post went on to quote Ilya Kovalchuk, the only other Russian who was at that time serving as a Captain of an NHL team:
“I would like to congratulate Alex on being named captain. He is a great player and a leader of their team, so I think he is a great choice and deserves to be their captain. I am proud that another Russian is getting this honor.”
After his rookie contract ended in 2008, Mr. Ovechkin signed a 13-year deal with the Washington Capitals worth $124 million - the most lucrative in NHL history. In an April 2008 post on his Russian-language LiveJournal blog (now dormant), Mr. Ovechkin discussed the contract along with how his NHL career would affect his participation on the Russian National Team:
Another popular question - the [Russian] National Team. I've already agreed to play, as long as it does not conflict with Cup games. […]
[…] A 13-year contract - it's excellent! I play for Washington and I want to do this in the future, I want to keep winning with this club, and [me getting tired of it is out of question]. After all, there are many players who play for a single club throughout their careers.
A year later, in March 2009, Yahoo Sports Blog captured the controversy surrounding Mr. Ovechkin in a post entitled “Ovechkin's 'stick on fire' goal celebration ticks off coaches”:
Faced with recent criticism about his boundless enthusiasm by both Canadian blowhard Don Cherry and arch rival Sidney Crosby of the Pittsburgh Penguins, Alexander Ovechkin did the punk rock thing tonight and celebrated his 50th goal with the theatrics of an NFL touchdown celebration.
Ovechkin's first-period goal in Tampa Bay gave him the third 50-goal season of his young career; and to celebrate, he dropped his stick to the ice and treated it like it was made of lava.
The post went on to provide Head Coach Bruce Boudreau's reaction to the incident:
“We had a little talk,” he said. “I won't say what we talked about, but we talked.”
After a pause, Boudreau added: “It's the first and only time I've seen that happen in all the time I've been watching Alex. I've never seen him do a celebration like that. But I don't expect it to happen again.”
Alex Ovechkin addresses the crowd in front of the Wilson Building in Washington DC after receiving the key to the city in honor of his winning the NHL's Hart Memorial Trophy as league MVP for the 2007–2008 season. He has just said, "Everybody have fun. No speed limit today." Photo by 1995hoo - June 13, 2008 (CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons)
Russian Machine Never Breaks Blog posted last fall that Mr. Ovechkin had become the second NHL player ever to be immortalized by Madame Tussauds Wax Museum:
Alex Ovechkin, sporting 10 stitches on his forehead after taking an errant puck to the face during Caps practice, traveled into DC this afternoon to celebrate his new wax immortality.
Surrounded by children from the Fort Dupont Ice Hockey Club, who were all rocking The Great 8′s signature gap-toothed smile, Ovechkin unveiled the figure to a horde of media and a few hundred passersby. To the surprise of no one, the wax figure’s resemblance to the Capitals captain is uncanny.
And rightly so. Ovechkin spent hours over the summer allowing studio artists from Madame Tussauds to take more than 250 precise measurements and photographs, capturing the two-time MVP from every angle. The artists then began work on the figure in early July and finished it just a few weeks ago. Ovi donated his Capitals uniform, pads and equipment – in which the figure is dressed – to ensure its authenticity.
ESPN Blog quoted Madame Tussauds Washington DC's General Manager Dan Rogoski as he paid tribute to Mr. Ovechkin:
“Alex Ovechkin is a tremendous athlete who has captivated hockey fans not only in the Washington D.C. area, but across the nation as well,” Madame Tussauds Washington D.C. general manager Dan Rogoski said Monday in a statement. “We are honored to add a figure of Alex to our roster of sports icons and know our guests will enjoy interacting and lining up alongside him for photos in our Sports Zone.”
And then last month Mr. Ovechkin was suspended for three games as a result of his hit on Pittsburgh’s Zbynek Michalek. ESPN blog included analysis of validity of the suspension in their Daily Debate between Scott Burnside and Pierre LeBrun.
Burnside:
This is the fifth suspension/fine for reckless behavior Ovechkin has incurred in his career or roughly one a year. I didn’t like the hit. […]
Well, hard to imagine that three games is anything more than an extended All-Star break for Ovechkin. […] You know what might have made an impact? A 10-game stint on the sidelines. Time to start making both teams and players pay for their dangerous work.
LeBrun:
Ten games? That is crazy. I actually think that hit didn’t warrant more than one game, but Ovechkin got three because of his two prior suspensions and two prior fines. […]
In light of his suspension, Mr. Ovechkin decided not to attend this year's NHL All Star game. The Washington Post Blog quoted Mr. Ovechkin:
“My heart is not there. I got suspended, so why I have to go there?” Ovechkin said. “I love the game, it’s a great event, I love to be there but I’m suspended.” […]
[…] “My game is play physical, my game is play hard, and I don’t think it was bad hit, dirty hit. Yeah, I jumped, but he don’t get hurt. I don’t get two minutes. I don’t think it was three-game suspension.” […]
Dmitry Chesnokov translated a 2009 article from SovSport.ru for Yahoo Blog, where Mr. Ovechkin articulated the real meaning of controversy:
I do not get angry with criticism. It's a good thing. If you are talked about, that means that you are liked and respected. But not in an ordinary form.
February 14 2012
Global Voices Seeks New Editor For RuNet Echo
Global Voices (GV) is seeking a part-time Project Editor to oversee our ongoing coverage of Russia. The RuNet Echo project focuses on deep coverage and analysis of Russian-language blogospheres, online speech and social networks.
The project presents comprehensive and deep reporting on and analyses of the Russian-language online community. We:
- Produce original analysis, research, and reporting based on our coverage of the Russian-language Internet.
- Follow up stories with in-depth research into compelling topics.
- Monitor and explains civil society initiatives, websites, and movements.
The primary focus of our coverage and analysis is Russian-language online writing from and about the Russian Federation. Secondary content may also include Russian-language content from the former Soviet Union, as it relates to the Russian Federation. GV will seek to ensure that the content receives broad recognition and publicity, both on our sites, and in other contexts and languages. As with all our projects we seek publicity, interviews, and re-publication in other media to further amplify the content.
In the past two years RuNet Echo has produced extensive and in-depth stories on the Russian Internet, breaking numerous stories in English on the rise of online influence in Russian political and social life.
The Project Editor will direct the project, manage project content on Global Voices sites, and coordinate staff and volunteer contributions, including overseeing contributing editors. The Project Editor will produce and/or edit several in-depth stories per week, as well as shorter posts linking and pointing to important topics, events, and writing as it occurs. The work will involve extensive translation, analysis, and further original research and reporting when appropriate, in order to elucidate and identify trends, ideas, and social and political currents within RuNet. Analysis will also examine how content in the Russian language space relates to other online communities, languages, and cultures, and offline Russian conversation, journalism, and social and political movements.
The Project Editor will also:
- Edit an ongoing Special Coverage section to consolidate and organize content from the RuNet project
- Manage the content of project sub-editors and contributing authors
- Work closely with Global Voices' existing Russian-focused editorial editors and authors.
- Work with other researchers and analysts of the Russian online world, in order to gain broader perspectives and diverse content
- Cultivate relationships with Russian bloggers and writers, toward the same end
- Present at conferences and events pertaining to the Russian online world
- Find and build relationships with citizen media and mass media partnerships in Russian
- Design and oversee research projects on RuNet-related themes
Successful applicants will have the following qualifications:
- Fluency in English and Russian. Articles will be published in English, with minimal editing. Writing samples will be required as part of the application.
- Familiarity with the Russian blogosphere, Russian social networks, and Russian political, social, economic, and cultural trends.
- Ability to report on, analyze, and explain the Russian online world, in English.
- Have the ability to work independently, in an unstructured work environment, and to work with a virtual community.
- Be computer literate, comfortable working with programmers and technical language. Programming/HTML knowledge is not required but strong familiarity with the use of online social media tools and norms (blogging platforms, aggregators, use of RSS feeds, and tagging) is important.
Interested candidates please send CV and Letter of Interest explaining why you'd be a good candidate for the job to: adminjob AT globalvoicesonline DOT org
We will be accepting applications through March 2, 2012.
Interpreting RuNet is funded by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.
February 10 2012
Russia: “Anti-Gay Propaganda Bill” Passes Second Reading
St. Petersburg is getting closer to signing into law the notorious “anti-gay propaganda bill” [ru]. On Feb. 8, lawmakers approved it on its delayed second reading, and, according to AllOut.com's Russia action page, the vote on the third - and final - reading is to take place next week.
Coming Out, a St. Petersburg-based LGBT rights NGO, wrote this [en] about the possible consequences of the law's adoption:
[…] If this law is passed, Russian LGBT will live in fear of punishment just for being open about sexual orientation in their social environment. It paves the way to legalized discrimination, justifies violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people. Moreover, under the pretense of protecting minors, this law in fact will lead to further isolation and greater number of suicides by homosexual adolescents in a country that is already leading in the numbers of teenage suicides. […]
The article cited above also has photos and video from a mini-protest that took place in front of St. Petersburg's Legislative Assembly building on Feb. 8. One protester, who ended up being detained by police, held a poster that said, “Hitler started with anti-gay laws”:
British author and actor Stephen Fry (@stephenfry) posted this comment on Twitter, referring to the Russian composer Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, who was homosexual, and linking to AllOut.com's appeal, “TELL RUSSIA: NO GAY GAG ORDER”:
Hell's teeth. Something must be done to stop these fantastical monsters. Will talking about Tchaikovsky be banned? http://www.allout.org/en/actions/russia_call
LJ user arzamaskaya ended her post about the lawmakers' initiative with this serious-sounding mock appeal [ru]:
[…] Somebody, do introduce sanctions against us [Russia] at last.
A protest sign outside the Russian consulate in London reads: "Council of Europe Must Defend Russian Gay Rights. Suspend the Russian Vote." Photo by MELPRESSMEN MELPRESSMEN, copyright © Demotix (1/07/11).
LJ user mc-leesnick linked to a Russian-language news item about Stephen Fry's reaction, adding [ru] that Russia, among other things, is also a country where “concrete facts of election fraud are declared 'speculation' before an investigation begins” and where “stealing from the state budget isn't punished but encouraged.” In the comments section, a rather typical exchange took place between the author of the blog and a reader:
plurlife: There are, of course, many other problems that no one is taking care of. But here we are talking about propaganda and underaged [kids], so to me everything seems logical enough. If you want to love someone of your own gender, do so, but don't make noise about it in the streets and don't hold gay parades. This, however, has to be in the subconscious, not in the legislation.
mc_leesnick: Listen, what's the problem with gay parades? Seriously: what is the problem?
plurlife: The problem is that children see it, they live with it and learn from it, and it becomes normal for them. And the problem is also that after gay parades, mass beatings of such “fun guys” takes place, which is also not very normal - people shouldn't be beaten up because of their orientation. I'm not a homophobe, or whatever you call it, I just don't understand why it is necessary to loudly announce that you're a homosexual, a transsexual, a lesbian, a drag queen? Do not try to convince people that it's normal - no matter how much they want it, it's never going to be normal. […] I don't call it a disorder and I don't think they should be locked and re-made, […], it's just that I don't see a point in such demonstrations - only problems. If even just [a Muslim prayer performed in public causes people to overreact], then what do you expect from homosexuals with their parades.
Another reader, LJ user kuzyabuster, echoed Stephen Fry's irony - and mentioned the lack of adequate response from the city authorities to the truly serious and often life-threatening problem that St. Petersburg's residents have to face every winter:
I can imagine trucks taking out of St. Petersburg the works of [Yukio Mishima], Stephen Fry, biographies of [Alexander the Great], Tchaikovsky, Oscar Wilde […]… Would be better if they were taking snow and icicles out…
Russian journalist Yelena Kostyuchenko is not new to explaining LGBT community's legal demands to her less knowledgeable compatriots. In May 2011, she wrote a powerful and popular post [ru] about her reasons to attend Moscow Pride 2011, and Global Voices translated parts of it in this text about yet another annual attempt to hold the event. On Feb. 8, following the St. Petersburg vote, Kostyuchenko (@mirrorsbreath) had a quick - and also quite typical - Twitter conversation with user @vakurov (Aleksandr Vakurov, who describes himself as a “psychoanalyst” and “business consultant”), parts of which are translated from Russian below:
[…] What's wrong with it? It's the propaganda that's getting banned, not homosexuality.
[…] Propaganda of homosexuality doesn't exist. In reality, the law stops the work of LGBT organizations, introduces censorship into the mass media and culture.
[…] Obviously, I'm not getting something. Don't I have the right to protect my children from the harmful homosexual ideology?
[…] Homosexuality doesn't have an ideology. It's a trait that 5-7% of the population are born with. Relax.
[…] No problem. Just don't spoil my appetite. Many people have bad breath - and they aren't demanding special rights.
[…] You are very spiritual, I can see it right away. We do not need special rights - we need equal rights. Do you feel the difference?
[…] What inequality are you talking about? Then how about the rights of pedophiles, drug traffickers, rapers, drug addicts? о_0
LJ user vg36 believes [ru] that the new law, if adopted, might affect not just the local LGBT community, but members of the opposition in general:
Until the Russian Federation has learned how to block internet access, the law banning [”gay propaganda”] is ridiculous. But does anyone seriously think that it only targets the Russian LGBT community? […]
They used to send [people dressed up/posing as gays] with rainbow flags to opposition rallies in order to discredit the protesters. Now it turns out that most protesters do not mind rainbow flags - so this will be done [fake gays will be sent in] in order to detain and fine [the protesters]. […]
But the opposition has been asleep, as usual, and/or didn't realize that this was another weapon against them. Or they were afraid to oppose a law that might possibly be very popular with the masses, afraid to defend the freedom of speech of an unpopular group. Well. With the opposition like that, [it's not surprising] we get laws like this and the situation in the country is the way it is.
February 09 2012
Russia: DDoS Attack Puts Down Several Political Websites As Cyberwar Escalates
On February 9, 2012, following the widely-discussed leaks of pro-Kremlin mailboxes, LiveJournal, where the leaks were published, became temporarily unavailable, Lenta.ru reported [ru]. Russian representative of Anonymous group @OP_Russia, suggested [ru] that it was a DDoS attack to hide the evidence of massive wrongdoings (including corruption, thievery, political provocations, and cybercrime) [ru] by Nashi youth movement. Later that day @OP_Russia took responsibility for taking down 3 websites of United Russia party: mos-partya.ru, er-region.ru, and er-kaluga.ru.
Russia: Three Conversations With Parents of Young Neo-Nazis
At OpenDemocracy.net, Olesya Gerasimenko talks to the parents of three young neo-Nazi men who were convicted of race murders: “One has adopted the views of their only child and says that violence is necessary. One blames the politicians that have incited adolescents to street fighting. One cries, convinced of the innocence of his son. They are all different, but they have all asked themselves one and the same question: ‘am I to blame for what happened?’”
February 08 2012
Russia: New .Ru Domain Registration Rules Allow Easy Domain Seizure
Andrey Rylkov Foundation writes about the first case of enforcement of the domain seizure rules in the “.ru” and “.рф” domain zones. The rules [ru] (Article 5, point 5.5) , updated on November 11, 2011 allow any law enforcement agency (like police, Federal Security Service, Prosecutor's office or Federal Drug Control Services (FDCS)) to request domain seizure without a court order. On February 3, 2012 FDCS successfully seized the domain of rylkov-fond.ru, a website of Rylkov Foundation that had severely criticized situation with drug trafficking.
Russia: The Anonymous Hacks and Publishes E-mails of Pro-Kremlin Youth Group
Read The Guardian's take on the so-called “Potupchik-gate,” a series of scandals surfaced as a result of hacking and publishing of private inbox of Kristina Potupchik [ru], press-secretary of Nashi, notorious pro-Kremlin youth group. All hacks were published by twitter-user @OP_Russia who uses Anonymous symbolics. Representatives of Anonymous, previously never seen involved in Russian online politics, had also issued an Russian/English statement on the issue.
February 07 2012
Ukraine: Netizens React to Popular File-Sharing Website's Shutdown
On January 31, Ukrainian Internet users learned that the country’s biggest file-sharing site, Ex.ua [ru], was shut down due to repeated copyright violations. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior, among the companies that filed a lawsuit [uk] against Ex.ua were Microsoft, Adobe, Graphisoft and others.
Ex.ua was one of the most popular websites in the country and accounted for 15-25% [uk] of Ukraine’s in-country traffic. It required no paid subscription and attracted millions of users who freely shared pirated video and audio files, games and software.
The news of the site's shutdown caused quite a stir online, with many netizens criticizing the government for going after Ex.ua and calling for its restoration.
Christina Vinovska (@chris_vinovska) tweeted a common appeal [en]:
return #exua immediately!
People are protesting against the shutdown of Ex.ua outside the Interior Ministry in Kyiv. Photo by Sergei Svetlitsky, copyright © Demotix (1/02/12).
While many echoed her plea, others decided to take action both offline (photos of the Feb. 1 protest in Kyiv are here) and online.
Thus, following the release of the online statement about Ex.ua's shutdown by the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry's website went down and remained periodically inaccessible due to “an increased number of visitors and possible DDoS attacks” [uk].
By that time many Twitter, Vkontakte and Facebook users were actively sharing detailed instructions [ru] on how to overload the servers of selected websites. The target list included websites of Ukraine’s President Victor Yanukovych, the pro-presidential Party of Regions, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Parliament, and others.
What seemed to begin as a number of decentralized attempts, quickly turned into a mass organized effort, with Ex.ua supporters forming a “Free Ex.Ua” [ru] group on a popular social network Vkontakte [ru], which gathered over 6,000 members during the first hours of its existence (currently, there are over 41,000 members). By February 1, the Presidential website was completely down [uk] and the Ministry of the Interior had to announce [uk] that it was going to use its two Facebook accounts until its official website was restored. By mid-day of February 1, Ex.ua had to appeal [ru] to users to stop the attack that succeeded in disrupting the work of nearly all major governmental websites:
Dear users,
Administrators of Ex.ua call on you to stop all illegal activity against governmental websites. […]
At the same time, a heated discussion of Ex.ua’s supposed illegal activity was taking place online.
Facebook user Sergei Sidorenko wrote [ru]:
In response to the mass mourning of the Ex.ua’s untimely death, I would tell you something different from what half of the Internet has been yelling about:
I do not have a single piece of licensed non-free software on my computer
I watch only pirated films
I jailbroke my Apple iPod soon after the purchase
Even the licensed Windows installed on my laptop I soon [removed] and installed a pirated one, because it was more convenient for meBut I have to admit that shutting down Ex.ua was the RIGHT THING. And I don’t understand those who now yell, “Yes, they were pirates, but was that a reason to close them?” […]
Guys, if we want to live a civilized [life], let’s at least not condemn the obvious attempts to establish legality.
In defense of Ex.ua, Yaroslav Fedorak of Blogosphere.com.ua wrote [uk]:
Yes, I really do believe that according to today’s legal framework, file-sharing website Ex.ua was conducting an illegal activity and sooner or later would have been closed. But don’t be too quick to throw stones at me! The problem here lies in the legal framework itself, which is hopelessly outdated and no longer meets the needs of the current super-dynamic and hyper-volatile environment.
Amidst such discussions, it was not long before Ukrainian Internet users began to question whether the authorities themselves were following the letter of the law. Giving in to increased media attention, the Ministry of the Interior had to admit [uk] that it was also using pirated software, while holding negotiations with Microsoft to end this practice. Netizens were outraged.
Yurko Chervony (@skinik) tweeted [uk]:
They should first shut themselves down, and not #ex.ua “[The Ministry of the Interior] admitted that half of the software [they're using] is illegal” tinyurl.com/7tjq7c8
Many netizens shared an online comment [uk] by Oleksandr Severyn of Maidan.org.ua:
When marauders fight with pirates, pirates become national heroes
Other netizens, however, believed that the government's action against Ex.ua was motivated not so much by the copyright violations, but by the website hosting [ru] an extremely popular parody video [uk] mocking the Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych.
Pavlo Rizanenko (@rizanenko) tweeted [uk]:
Our authorities closed #exua because they did not want to have an uncontrollable information resource on #UaNet [Ukrainian Internet – GV]. Piracy was just an excuse rizanenko.livejournal.com/983.html
Whatever the actual causes of its shutdown, following the unexpected mass reaction of Ukrainian netizens, Ex.ua was back online [ru] as early as February 3, when the investigators concluded [ru] that piracy allegations did not have to result in blocking of the site's domain name.
Many netisens viewed it as a positive case of online consolidation and organization of Ukrainians.
Serge Lavrinchuck (@Lavrinchuck) tweeted [uk]:
The #EXua story, of course, has its positive sides. When else the Ukrainian people would have united like this to attack government websites?
Numerous observers referred to the attacks as the “online revolution” [ru]. Maksym Savanevsky, editor of the Internet business and SMM website Watcher.com.ua, wrote [uk]:
What has changed in the society in the past 60 hours.
Most important: the citizens have had a taste of their victory. They have felt that “together they are many, and they cannot be defeated”. It is difficult to recall similar events since 2004 [Orange Revolution – GV].
Yes, the scope was not the same. Yes, everything happened online, inside warm apartments. But it has been a while since the authorities looked so helpless in the face of the people’s simple desire to get something they thought they deserved.
Still, others were critical of the society mobilizing in defense of a pirate website. Jouranlist Serhiy Shcherbyna wrote [ru]:
Where are you, the renowned [citizens], when honest, normal businesses are being bluntly taken from ordinary mid-level entrepreneurs? […] Why nobody touches the Tax Inspection's website for their regular [pressure] on business?
Why would you not [disable] the Interior Ministry's website when people are being killed at [local police stations]? Why would you not [disable] the Kyiv City Administration's website for [icy] roads on which people are breaking arms and legs every day?
Why are Ukrainians able to protest only when their social benefits and [free stuff] are taken away? Freedom of speech, the lawlessness of the authorities, politically-motivated [imprisonments], a half-dead economy and, most of all, a country that is nearing a collapse, all this is not causing such an outrage.
While the online polemics continue and the future fate of Ex.ua remains unclear, as of February 6, the website is operational and works on restoring its full capacity.
February 06 2012
Russia: Practice of Compulsory Military Service Comes Under Attack
Russia's compulsory military service practices have come under attack for a variety of reasons, including the issues of economic inefficiency, governmental corruption connected with determining exemptions from service, dynamics of Russia's demographic status as it affects the military's ability to meet its quotas, and the practice of dedovshchina (from the Russian word for ‘grandfather'), a violent form of hazing directed at young conscripts.
Known as the first Emperor of Russia, Peter the Great included a “recruit obligation” in his efforts to form the Imperial Russian Army. The term of service in the 18th-century Russia was for life, until it was reduced to 25 years in 1793, 20 years with an additional 5 years in reserve in 1834, and 12 years active duty in 1855. Russia's modern conscription practices date back to a 1967 law that remained largely unchanged until the mid-2000's, when the term of service was reduced to 1 year in 2008 for all men aged 18-27.
Writing for The Volokh Conspiracy Blog, a group blog comprised mostly of law professors, Ilya Somin put the practice of conscription in its historical context by paraphrasing an article written by economist Joshua Hall:
Economist Joshua Hall has an interesting article describing an oft-ignored, but very important expansion of freedom over the last several decades: the declining use of military conscription. He notes that, as of 1970, some 80% of the world’s governments used conscription, including the US and many of the democratic nations of Western Europe. By 2009, that had declined to 45%, and many of those nation that still have conscription have reduced the length of conscript’s terms and made it easier to escape the draft. Even France, the nation that first pioneered conscription in the 1790s, abolished it in 2001.
Hall also gives a good summary of the economic case against conscription. Most knowledgeable people are aware of the standard points that conscription reduces the quality of the military because professionals are, on average, better soldiers than short-term conscripts, and that conscription creates major social costs by forcing people to serve who would be more productive in other occupations. Hall notes two other ways in which conscription is inefficient that are less well-known – that it creates deadweight losses by diverting people from their preferred occupations to those which have draft exemptions, and that it encourages governments to underinvest in military equipment and instead sacrifice more lives in battle rather than capital […]
In addition to the economic inefficiency issues associated with conscription, there are governmental hazards as well in that it is known to incite corruption. International Defense and Security Programme Blog discussed in general terms the importance of applying a mandatory military service law equally, regardless of socio-economic status, and then cited Russia's military as a specific example of the methods by which conscription corrupts the military, along with efforts the Russian government has taken to address these issues:
Compulsory military service can be a cause of pervasive corruption within the armed forces. Such is the case in Russia. In order to avoid conscription, would-be soldiers pay bribes to the military authorities, medical personnel in charge of assessment and officials in draft boards. Such practices are widespread and publicly acknowledged.
In July 2010, Russia’s nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, tabled draft legislation which would allow potential conscripts to pay a sum equivalent to US $32,500 to avoid military service. The resulting funds would be channeled toward the costs of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This measure, aimed at Russia’s military commissions, signifies both the great extent of draft corruption in the country and a clear recognition of this reality.
Serious attempts to deal with this issue have been made in recent years by the Russian government. The length of conscript service was shortened by six months in April 2008 to one year, while the list of exemptions from conscriptions has also been made more restrictive. However, the 2004-7 federal government programme designed to trial a transition to fully professional armed forces was largely ineffective, due to poor design and pervasive corruption which prevents full remuneration from reaching the contracted soldiers.
Mikhail Prokhorov's 2012 presidential election program included putting an end to Russia's compulsory military service by 2015:
• Create a professional, mobile, high-tech army, able to respond quickly to local and regional conflicts;
• Pay special attention to our strategic nuclear forces and space-based weapons as means of ensuring Russia’s independence and security;
• End military conscription from 2015 while moving to a professional army;
• Ensure social benefits for war veterans (free education, tax exemptions and soft loans to start businesses or buy housing) […]
Global Voices discussed in a post entitled, “Russia: Demographic Collapse Means ‘No One Left to Draft',” how the low birth rate of the 1990s has affected Russia's ability to maintain conscription quotas. However, demographic decline was only one of the major factors that General Nikolai Makarov, Russia's chief of the General Staff, mentioned in a RIA Novosti article quoted in the aforementioned GV post; dedovshchina was the other one:
Russia has no conscript-age young men left to recruit […].
The current conscript service crisis in the Russian Armed Forces is mainly due to demographic decline, bullying and brutal treatment of conscripts. […]
Marina Litvinovich reported for Global Voices on a relatively new trend where social media accounts of those who have died have been converted into memorials. One such memorial was dedicated to Evgeniy Shamukhin, a Russian soldier who had been drafted and then beaten to death during a dedovshchina ritual:
I was drafted in November 2007 and served in the Academy of the Ministry for Emergency Situations in Moscow region. On May 13, 2008, I was brutally beaten up by my fellow soldier Alexandr Revyakin. He was beating my head with his feet regardless of my appeals to stop it, and at the end I lost consciousness. Suffering serious injuries and not coming to my senses I passed away in a hospital on May 19, 2008. On August 14, 2008, the military court of Solnechnogorsk city sentenced Revyakin to 6 years and 6 months of detention.
Russian soldiers march during a rehearsal for the Victory Day military parade at Palace Square in St. Petersburg. Photo by Elena Ignatyeva, copyright © Demotix (18/04/11).
Russia has one of the highest suicide rates in the world, and it is believed that close to 1 million Russian people have taken their own lives since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Russian Defense Policy Blog argued that the dedovshchina practices associated with Russia's compulsory military service make young soldiers even more prone to suicidal actions:
Dedovshchina has always had potential to drive desperate conscripts to take their own lives to escape it. Hence, the majority of Russian Army suicide cases are investigated under Article 110 of the RF Criminal Code, “Incitement to Suicide.” Western legal tradition has long experience with incitement, but “incitement to suicide” is a little unusual. Not so for Russian military prosecutors and criminal investigators.
The author went on to list recent accounts found in the Russian press of young Russian soldiers who had indeed taken their own lives or who had attempted to do so:
In late August, a conscript on guard duty in Volgograd shot himself, leaving a suicide note blaming dedovshchina in his unit. The case is being investigated under Article 110.
In late August, a conscript from a Krasnoyarsk unit was detailed to the Railroad Troops brigade in Abakan to help prepare for Tsentr-2011. With only three months left to serve, he went AWOL, and apparently hung himself.
In mid-August, a conscript in Kaliningrad jumped off the boiler house roof and sustained a number of serious injuries, but survived. He had left a note asking that no one be blamed in his death.
In early August, a conscript in the 735th Missile Regiment, 62nd Missile Division in Uzhur killed himself while on guard duty at night. He had served six months.
In early March, in Belogorsk, a conscript due to demob in a few days shot himself to death.
In early February, a conscript in Sergeyevka shot himself to death. The case was being investigated under Article 110.
Public awareness of the soldiers who have taken their own lives has grown recently. A June 2011 Radio Free Europe article described an incident where protesters gathered in Moscow in response to the surge of soldiers who had died under such circumstances in the previous months.
In a November 2011 post, Russian Defense Policy Blog relayed the results of a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation, which surveyed 3,000 people living in 64 of Russia's regions. Many of the questions that were asked reflected a widespread awareness that dedovshchina exists, that it is related in some way to compulsory military service, and that many young men resort to illicit activities in order to avoid military service:
Finally, buried deep in the results, participants were asked for their views on the state of affairs in the Russian Army in coming years:
• 19% said it will improve.
• 19% said it will worsen.
• 35% said it will stay the same.
• 26% said hard to answer.However, when asked to compare military service conditions today against those 10-15 years ago, more respondents said they are easier (39%), and many fewer said they are harder (14%), by comparison with Russians asked the same question in 2002 (just 6% and a whopping 64% respectively).
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